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NOTES
LIABILITY OF A TRUSTEE FOR TORTS OF HIS SERVANTS
The recent case of Clauson v. Stull 1 has raised some interesting questions
relative to the liabilities incurred by a fiduciary through the torts of his agents
or servants.2 The statements of the case are dicta merely, as the problems
discussed were not in fact before the court for decision, but the thoughts expressed, when considered with reference to other decisions, give some definite
indication of the probable holding of our Supreme Court when such question
are presented to it for determination.
There are three primary questions to be considered. First:. Is a trustee
liable in his individual capacity for the torts, of his- servants? Second: Is a.
1331 Pa. 101, 200 A. 593 (1938).
2
Thbe language throughout' this note applies equally to all fiduciaries
*truste,:" will be the one most 'frequently used.

although the 'term
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trustee liable in his representative capacity for the torts of his servants? Third:
If the latter is true, is recovery directly against the estate or is it solely a right
enforceable by the trustee by way of exoneration or reimbursement? The
ramifications of these questions are myriad; hence, this note will be limited
necessarily to an examination of the elements to be considered in answering
these queries either in the affirmative or the negative.
Case law and text authority agree that the primary liability for torts of a
trustee's servant is upon the trustee as an individual.' A fair statement of
this general rule is:
"A trustee is liable in his individual and not in his official capacity
for the torts of himself and his servants employed in the execution
4
of the trust, irrespective of his right to reimbursement."'
This was the rule of the common law and has been retained throughout the
years as the fundamental principle. 5 The theory is that when the trustee or
his agent or servant commits a tort, he steps out of the line of his duty; in
other words, insofir as he commits a wrong he does not represent the estate,
and therefore, it should not be held liable. 6 Sometimes it is stated that the
corpus of the estate should be held intact for the beneficiaries, and that the
trustee should not be allowed to dissipate it by the wrongdoing of himself or
his employees.' As will be noted later, however, the soundness of this position
is impaired somewhat by those cases which permit reimbursement of the
trustee under certain conditions.8 Another difficulty in the way of holding the
trustee officially liable for the torts of his servants seems to have been that the
law courts, being concerned solely with the question of legal ownership, did
not recognize the trust relation or the trust estate, 9 and when a suit was brought
by a third person the only other party in the picture was the trustee in his indi-

vidual capacity as owner of the legal title.10 The question of the trustee's personal negligence or of his right to reimbursement out of the estate simply were
not relevant.
Recognizing the harshness of this primary rule and the injustice wrought
by it, the courts gradually came to recognize certain exceptions to it. For
33 Bogert: Trusts and Trustees, sec. 731; 26 R. C. L., p. 1319, sec. 178; 65 C. J., sec.

524; Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan, 180 Ky. 609, 203 S. W. 555 (1918); Fisher v. McNeely,
110 Wash. 283, 188 Pac. 478 (1920); Prager v. Gordon, 78 Pa. Super. 76 (1921).
465 C. J. sec. 524; Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan, 180 Ky. 609, 203 S. W. 555 (1918).
544 A. L. R. 640-642 and cases there cited.
644 A. L. R. 638.
1Prager v. Gordon, 78 Pa. Super. 76 (1921); Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan, 180 Ky.
.09, 203 S. W. 555 (1918); 44 A. L. R. 638.
8See text infra at notes 11-13.
9Schmidt v. Kellner, 307 Ill. 331, 138 N. E. 604 (1923); Parmenter v. Barstow, 22 R. I.
245, 47 A. 365 (1900).
10In re Lather's Will, 243 N. Y. S. 366 (1930); Fisher v. McNeely, 110 Wash. 283, 188
Pac. 478 (1920); Schmidt v. Kellner, 307 111.331, 138 N. E. 604 (1923).
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example, it has been held that "where a person creates a trust and charges the
trustee with certain specific duties, in the carrying out of which it is contemplated certain results will follow, then the trust estate is liable "for such contemplated results."" Likewise, it has been held that where an active trust is
created and the trustee is charged with carrying on a business, the trust estate
may be held liable for negligence of the trustee and his employees,' 2 especially
where the management of the trust estate is under the supervision and control
of the cestuis.' 3 It also has been held that the rule could not be enforced in
the face of specific provisions in the trust instrument relieving the trustees from
individual liability for the torts of themselves and their servants. 14 These
exceptions, and certain other considerations in particular cases, have in recent
years been the basis of a trend away from the old rule toward one allowing
recovery against the trustee in his representative capacity.
Because of the strict regard ofl' the law for the preservation of the trust
corpus intact, the trustee was for years not even granted a right of reimbursement out of the estate where he had himself committed no wrong. s Judicial
recognition of a right to indemnity on the part of the trustee is of recent
origin. 16 A case showing the ultimate in the modern trend, and perhaps th
correct answer from the standpoint of logic, is the case of Ewing v. Foley.1
Following directions in testator's will the executors erected a building. Due
to no personal fault or negligence on their part their agent negligently caused
the undermining of an adjacent property. The injured party sued the trustees
in their representative capacity, and the court held that recovery would be
allowed against the trustees as such, with recovery directly against the estate,
rather than against the trustees with a right on the part of the latter to be
reimbursed out of the estate. The court asserts this to be a case of first
impression in the Texas courts, finds only English cases in support of their
doctrine, and admits that the majority of American jurisdictions hold to the
contrary. In brief, the reasoning is that where, in pursuance of testamentary
directions, a trustee without personal fault incurs liability to a third person for
the tort of his servant, said trustee should be entitled to indemnity out of the
corpus of the trust estate, and to avoid circuity of action said recovery will be
allowed against the trust estate directly in a suit against said fiduciaries in their
11Ross v. Moses, 175 S. C. 355, 179 S. E. 757 (1935).
l"Wright v. Caney River R. Co., 151 N. C. 529, 66 S. E. 588 (1909); Smith v. Coleman,
100 Fla. 1707, 132 So. 198 (1931); 'Ireland v. Bowman, 130 Ky. 153, 113 S. W. 56 (1908);
Birdsorij v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S. W. (2d) 98 (1928).
'5Wright v. Caney River R. Co., 151 N. C. 529, 66 S. E. 588 (1909); Ross v. Moses,
175 S. C. 355, 179 S. E. 757 (1935).
14Prinz v. Lucas, 210 Pa. 620, 60 A. 309 (1905).

155 Bogert: Trusts and Trustees, sec. 731.
1643 Harvard Law Review 1122 (1930).
17115 Tex. 222, 280 S. W. 499 (1926).

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

representative capacity. There are few cases either in American or foreign
jurisdictions which go this far. Some purport to, but on closer examination
they can all be distinguished.
It is submitted that there are very few good discussions of the problem in
the reported cases. One of the best appears in In re Lather's Will,"8 a New
York case. Here again, the court admits that this is a case of first impression
in that state on the question of whether or not a trustee is entitled to reimbursement out of the trust estate for damages recovered against him for the tort of
his servant. It is therein said:
"Some element of personal fault is recognized as the only basis
for charging a trustee with negligence of an agent employed in
the administration of the trust estate. The personal and fiduciary
nature of a trust relationship prevents a trustee from delegating to
another the management and control of the trust estate or duties
requiring the exercise of his own personal discretion. But, where
the duties are of a purely ministerial nature, or of a type he could
not reasonably be expected to perform personally, a trustee has the
as may be necessary for the proper
right to employ such assistance
9
execution of the trust."'
If, then, this right exists, the trustee ought to be protected from liability where
he exercises the power with due care and diligence.20 Continuing, the New
York court says:
"The cases against the proposition of reimbursement all weave
around the thought that the corpus must not pay for the 'careless
act' of the trustee, or through the 'negligence' of the trustee or
the trustee's 'own neglect' or 'willful wrong' or his 'own negligent
act.' But, if the trustee acted without personal fault, the law of
our state should permit him to be indemnified out of the trust
funds or estate which he represents. Equity as a court of conscience will refuse to apply the strict common law doctrine. ...
The trustee has gained nothing, and the trust estate has lost nothReimbursement on these facts
ing through his personal negligence.
2
is the only reasonable thing." '

18243 N. Y. S. 366

(1930).

191d. at page 375.
2OHale's Estate, 9 Pa. Dist. R. 389 (1900).
21243 N. Y. S. at page 375

(1930).
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This line of reasoning seems meritorious and worthy of consideration. Incidentally, the case clarifies the prior New York law on the subject as set forth
in McCue v. Fink,22 Kellogg v4 Church Charity Foundation,23 and Gatti-McQuade Co. v. Flynn.24 The final conclusion, so far as New York is concerned,
is that where the trustee has acted without personzl fault he is entitled to reimbursement out of the trust estate. The third party injured, however, must
him to assert. his right to reimbursement
sue the trustee individually, leaving
25
agains;t the estate, if possible.
This question of the right of the trustee to reimbursement out of the estate
on certain conditions is one of the problems left open by the case of Clauson v.
Stull.21 Recognizing that any expression given on the subject would be dictum
purely, Justice Maxey proceeds to cite a paragraph from Corpus Juris, 27 and
then notes briefly the holdings of the four cases there cited. 28 Smith v. Coleman29 recognizes the general rule of personal liability but is within an exception
previously noticed-where a trustee is charged with carrying on a business,
the trust estate should bear the loss. Such a case will not frequently arise.
Birdsong v. Jones"° is to the same effect. That was a case where the will provided that trustees were to manage and carry on a newspaper business. Wright
v. Caney River Ry. Co.31 is to the same general effect. There, too, an active
trust was created. The fourth case is Ireland v. Bowman.3 2 The case is definitely not authority for any general proposition allowing the trustee a general
right I:o reimbursement when he is without fault. The case was one resulting
from the maintenance of a dam. The dam was adjudged a nuisance, and
recovery was allowed against the trustee as such for its maintenance. However,
it is necessary to notice that the dam had been erected by testator at its present
height, and the trustee had been directed to maintain it. This, then, was a
case of a testator expressly directing the trustee to commit a tort, and obviously
the trust estate should bear the loss. Such a case will not frequently arise.
In each of these four cases the trustee was allowed to indemnify himself out of
the trust estate, but none of these cases is authority for recognizing a general
right to such reimbursement, since each time the court has been careful to
2246 N. Y. S. 242 (1897).
23112 N.Y. S. 566 (1908).
24140 N. Y. S. 135. (1913).
261n re Lather's Will, 243 N. Y. S. 366 (1930).
26331 Pa. 101, 200 A. 593 (1938).
276!, C. J. sec. 524, page 660.
28
Sinith v. Coleman, 100 Fla. 1701, 132 So. 198 (1931); Ireland v. Bowman, 130 Ky.
153, 113 S. W. 56 (1908); Birdsong v. Jones, 222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S. W. (2d) 98 (1928);
Wright v. Caney River R. Co., 151 N. C. 529, 66 S. E. 588 (1909).
29100 Fla. 1707, 132 So. 198 (1931).
30222 Mo. App. 768, 8 S. W. (2d) 98 (1928).
81! N. C. 529. 66 S. E. 588 (1909).
321.,0 Ky. 153, 113 S. W. 56 (1908).
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bring the case within an exception to the old rule not allowing such indemnification. It is submitted that there are apparently two cases from American
jurisdictions which could be cited as authority for the proposition that whenever there is no personal fault on the part of the trustee he is entitled to be
reimbursed out of the estate. These cases are those already mentioned - one
34
in New York33 and one in Texas.
There are two cases in the English reports bearing on our problem. In
Benett v. Wyndham, 5 decided in 1862, during the proper course of administering a trust, the trustee ordered certain trees felled. Woodcutters usually employed on the estate undertook the job. Through their carelessness a limb
fell and injured a passerby. Recovery was had against the trustee and he
sought reimbursement out of the trust estate. Said the court:
"The trustee appears to have meant well, to have acted with due
diligence, and to have employed a proper agent to do an act the
directing of which to be done was within the due discharge of his
duty. The agent makes a mistake, the consequences of which
subject the trustee to legal liability to a third party. I am of
opinion that this liability ought, as between the trustee and the
36
estate, to be borne by the estate." 1
This doctrine was followed later in In re Raybould"7 which went a step further
and allowed recovery directly against the trust estate under such facts, in order
to avoid circuity of action.38
This is the extent of the reported cases directly deciding that there is a
general right to reimbursement on the part of a trustee. There are just a few
other obiter expressions from United States courts which might be noticed as
showing the trend of judicial opinion. In Ferrier v. Trepannier89 there is a
statement to the effect that had it been before the court it would have been
held that where, due to no personal fault, injury is caused to a third person,
the trustee can be recovered against in his representative capacity. Also, in
40
Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, a Federal case, Judge Lowell
indicates by way of dictum that "the law on this point is so plain that no case
can be found in the Massachusetts reports expressly sanctioning the payment
from a private trust fund of damages for a tort committed in the administration
331n re Lather's Will, 243
34Ewing v. Foley, 115 Tex.
354 De G. F. & J. 259, 45
361d. at page 263, 45 Eng.
37(1900) 1 Ch. 199.
38Id. at page 202.
3924 Can. S. C. 86 (1895).

40109 Fed. 294 (1901).

N. Y. S. 366 (1930).
222, 280 S. W. 499 (1926).
Eng. Repr. 1183 (1862).
Repr. at page 1185.
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of trust property, though the practice must be of weely occurrence in this city
of Boston."' 4
There is equally little authority on the proposition that where the trustee
has a right to exoneration or indemnity the action can be brought by the injured
pa~r directly against the trust estate. This now seems to be the English rule, 4 2
and it has, as before noted, been recognized in only one American jurisdiction.'"
There are several other cases from American jurisdictions apparently allowing
recoiery directly against the trust estate,"' but these cases should be distinguished,
for they are from states where the distinction between actions at law and in
equity has been abolished." 5 It is assuredly the majority opinion that such suit
cannot be maintained directly against the trust estate.
The Restatement of Trusts recognizes the general rule of individual liability of the trustee. Section 264 reads:
"The trustee is subject to personal liability to third persons for
torts committed in the course of the administration of the trust
to the same extent that he would be liable if he held the propertyl
free of trust."
and comment b. of that section specifically says that the section includes liability
incurred through torts of agents or servants. Section 247 of the Restatement,
comment b., adopts the broad rule laid down in Texas, New York and England.
It reads:
"Where a tort to a third person results from the negligence of an
agent or servant properly employed by the trustee in the administration of the trust, and the trustee is not personally at fault,
although the trustee is liable to the third person, he is entitled to
indemnity out of the trust estate."
Section 266 holds that:
"A person to whom the trustee has become liable cannot reach
trust property in an action at law against the trustee, although the
liability was properly incurred by the trustee in the course of the
administration of the trust."
Section 267 provides that in certain classes of cases a person to whom the

411. at page 300.
421a re Raybould, (1900) 1 Ch. 199.
431'.wing v. Foley, 115 Tex. 222, 280 S. W. 499 (1926).
44rright v. Caney River R. Co., 151 N. C. 529, 66 S. E. 588 (1909);
man, 133 Ky. 153, 113 S. W. 56 (1908).
45S:hmidt v. Kellner, 307 II1. 331, 138 N. E. 604 (1923).

Ireland v. Bow-
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trustee has incurred a liability can, by a proceeding in equity, reach the trust
46
property.
Where will Pennsylvania stand when these problems are presented for
decision? The first one, as to personal liability of a trustee, has already been
decided.

In Prager v. Gordon47 the court said:
"For any cause of action arising through the negligence of an
executor or trustee in managing an estate such executor or trustee
is personally liable, and the action must be brought against him in
his individual capacity. Certainly he has no authority committed
to him in his official capacity to do wrong, and because the act is
'4
wrongful, it follows it is in excess of his authority. 8

This, of course, does not dispose of the problem of the right of the trustee to
indemnity out of the trust estate where the liability to a third person has been
incurred through no personal negligence of himself as trustee. This question
has never been decided by our Supreme Court. However, the fact that in
4
the court takes note of certain cases allowing the trustee
Clauson v. Stull"
reimbursement, and does not criticize them, may be some evidence that Pennsylvania will allow the trustee to be indemnified out of the trust estate at least
when the case can be brought within these well-recognized exceptions. It is to
be hoped, however, that our Supreme Court will go even further, and will
recognize the general rule that where the liability is incurred without any
personal negligence on the part of the trustee, the trustee will, as a general
rule, be entitled to reimbursement from the trust estate. Such a rule would
have the support of reasoning, if not of case precedent, and since are courts
are labeled courts of justice, it does not seem an untoward step or one which
would work hardship, to adopt this general principle.
Will Pennsylvania allow a suit at law directly against the trust estate in
those cases where the trustee is entitled to reimbursement? The language used
in Prager v. Gordons0 would suggest a negative answer here, but it is submitted
that this result is questionable. Pennsylvania has always administered equitable doctrines in the law courts, and further, our Supreme Court would not
be without precedent in allowing such a suit directly against the trust estate
in a law court. In Prinz v. Lucas5 ' the suit was brought by the injured party
directly against the trust estate. The action was assumpsit. It is true that in

46These circumstances are set out in sections 268-271 inclusive.
4778 Pa. Super. 76 (1921).
481d. at page 79.
49331 Pa. 101, 200 A. 593 (1938).
6078 Pa. Super. 76 (1921).
51210 Pa. 620, 60 A. 309 (1905).
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that case the terms of the trust instrument specifically provided that no responsibility whatever should result to the trustees by reason of the negligence of their
agents, and that all such liability should be borne solely by the trust estate.
It would seem, however, that the case could be safely cited as authority for the
proposition that under "certain circumstances" suit will be allowed at law
direci:ly against the trust estate. What more equitable "certain circumstances"
could. there be than those exemplified by the situation where, through no personal fault of his own, a liability devolves upon the trustee by reason of the
negligence of his agent or servant? Whether or not the Supreme Court will
adopt: such reasoning is a matter of speculation, but, even if such reasoning is
not adopted, it would seem that such suit could properly be allowed on the
ground of avoiding circuity of action.
Hn conclusion, it is submitted that regardless of what or how many genera'
rules are laid down on this subject, probably more cases than not will be decided
without reliance on them, for the reason that frequently there will be some
provision or other in the trust instrument itself which will control or guide the
court to the proper conclusion. The above propounded rules, however, seem
the most reasonable for those situations where nothing is contained in the
trust instrument indicating where the burden of tort responsibility shall lie.
ROBERT

McK.

GLASS

